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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, : 
INC. , 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
: Case No. 20292 
vs. 
PATRICIA WADE fka PATRICIA 
BURKE, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting respondent's 
motion to dismiss when a cause of action existed and there were 
issues of fact and law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this proceeding, appellant, a Utah corporation, filed an 
action against the respondent alleging fraudulent actions on the 
part of the respondent in acquiring a piece of property in which 
appellant claimed an interest. The appellant filed an initial 
complaint and an amended complaint and following a number of 
hearings, the trial court with the Honorable Judith M. Billings 
presiding, granted the respondent's motion for dismissal. This 
appeal is filed specifically to reverse that ruling. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that this court reverse the decision 
of the trial court and allow the matter to be tried on its 
merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Advance Business Equipment, Inc., a Utah corporation, is an 
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operating entity located in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is 
primarily in the business of selling office machines in the 
Intermountain area. The president and principal stockholder of 
Advance Business is Richard Burke. In 1980, Richard Burke and 
the defendant were engaged in divorce proceedings in a separate 
action in the District Court of Salt Lake County, civil number 
D-15225. In that proceeding, it was Richard Burke's position 
that a home in which the parties resided, located at 
approximately 785 East 4596 South, in Salt Lake County, and 
adjoining pasture land acreage was owned by the appellant herein 
and was not marital property. Judge Ernest Baldwin, however, 
determined that the property was marital property and awarded the 
home to the respondent and the adjoining acreage to Richard 
Burke. 
For various reasons that were set out in the initial 
complaint and subsequent affidavits in this case, the divorce 
decree was never reduced to writing and both parties intended to 
appeal the court's judgment. The respondent had advised 
appellant that she would maintain a lis pendens on the property, 
as claiming that the entire property should have been awarded to 
her, and that she would do so until such time as the original 
divorce order was resolved on appeal. (See R.p.2-4 and p.40-43.) 
Subsequent to that time, the pasture land property was 
foreclosed by a third party, RoyType, who had a judgment against 
the appellant. The appellant did not take steps to prevent the 
foreclosure because appellant was advised by the respondent that 
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her lis pendens would be maintained and therefore, RoyType would 
be unable to get title to the property. (See R.p.37-38 and 
31-32.) The respondent, however, released the lis pendens 
sometime later without advising the appellant and made a private 
arrangement with the third party and secured the property in her 
name. 
Appellant brought this action in May of 1984 to reassert and 
establish it's interest in said property based upon the 
fraudulent acts of the respondent. Following the filing of the 
initial complaint, (see R.p.2-4) the respondent filed a motion 
for summary judgment alleging inter alia that the fraud had not 
been pled with particularity. (R.p.24-29) A hearing was held on 
said motion on June 29, 1984. (R.p.39) At that time, the court 
denied the motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint 
without prejudice, and gave the appellant ten days to plead 
fraud. An amended complaint was filed within the required time 
(R.p.40-42) in which fraud was pled with particularity. The 
respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. (R.p.47-48) On September 7, 1984 following oral argument 
to the court, the court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss for 
no cause of action and on the respondent's counterclaim, quieted 
the title to the respondent. (R.p.63) That order was appealed 
to this court on October 18, 1984. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting respondent's motion to 
dismiss which was in effect a motion for summary judgment in that 
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there were issues of fact and law and a cause of action sounding 
in fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has long taken the position that any summary 
proceeding which is dispositive of a lawsuit should be viewed 
with great caution so that a party whose cause might have merit 
is not deprived of the right to access to the court for the 
enforcement of rights to redress of wrongs. See McBride v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 432 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, the appellant filed an action to assert it's 
rights in a piece of real estate in Salt Lake County. The 
appellant's basic cause of action sounded in fraud. Essentially, 
the appellant's position was that it had relied on certain 
representations made by the defendant which caused it to forebear 
in taking any action to prevent the foreclosure of the property 
by a third party, RoyType. If the appellant is correct in it's 
allegations and the respondent did exactly what was stated in the 
amended complaint and the affidavit of both Richard Burke and 
counsel for the appellant, then the actions were clearly 
fraudulent; she made material misrepresentations which caused 
others to rely on them to their detriment when she knew that the 
representations were in fact untrue and in fact she was intending 
all along to secure an interest for herself in the property which 
she had not been able to do in the original divorce proceeding. 
The difficulty for Judge Billings seemed to be the argument 
that was presented in defendant's second motion to dismiss which 
was, in effect, "even if the allegations are correct, it would 
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not affect the plaintiff's title to the property because of the 
intervention of the third party." The problem with this argument 
is that it fails to recognize two important aspects of this case: 
1. That the initial decision concerning this property by a 
District Court Judge in a divorce proceeding was itself being 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and therefore, had not been 
finalized. 2. The judgment divesting the appellant of it's 
interest in this property by the third party did not divest the 
interest of the appellant that it may obtain through the 
respondent if the original divorce decree is modified on appeal 
concerning whether or not the entire property belonged to the 
corporation. 
The order in the case of RoyType v. Advance Business 
Equipment, et al, Civil Mo. C82-8963, is specific in that it 
removes any claims of the appellant to RoyTypefs right, title and 
interest to the property but does not remove any interest the 
appellant may have as it pertains to Patricia Burke's interest in 
said property. (See R.20-22) This becomes important if one 
views the situation in two alternative ways: 
1. If the appellant is successful in the divorce appeal in 
persuading this court to reverse Judge Baldwin's decision and 
determine that all of the property, including the home, belong to 
the corporation and was not marital property, then the interest 
that Patricia Burke claimed in the home would revert to the 
appellant and appellant would then be in a position to negotiate 
for the pasture land property utilizing it's interest in the 
home. 
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2. Notwithstanding the appeal, if Patricia Burke had 
maintained her lis pendens as she indicated that she would do 
based upon the fact that she believed that all of the property 
should have been awarded to her, RoyType would never have been 
able to gain clear title to the property. The appellant was 
prepared at the time to negotiate with the respondent to make 
some disposition of the property so that both parties could 
clearly obtain their interest in the property free of the RoyType 
obligation. 
Admittedly, these are speculative matters, however, it is 
clear that had the appellant known that the respondent had no 
intention of maintaining her lis pendens when RoyType moved for 
foreclosure, it could have taken steps like filing bankruptcy or 
some other action to stop the proceedings. The appellant's 
reliance on respondent to maintain the lis pendens in effect 
caused the appellant to forebear from taking any steps to protect 
it's interest. As a practical matter, RoyType did have a 
judgment against the appellant and foreclosed against that 
judgment, and appellant basically had no way at the time to clear 
the judgment within the normal six month period. It could have, 
however, filed a bankruptcy or taken some other action to stay 
the proceedings if the appellant had known that the respondent's 
lis pendens was not filed. Thus, the argument that it makes no 
difference simply is not sustainable if one reviews the entire 
transaction between these parties. 
Appellant concedes that it has an up hill battle at best and 
that it's case is contingent upon being able to prove the 
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misrepresentations and the fraudulent acts complained of by the 
respondent. The appellant, however, should be allowed to do this 
in a trial on the merits. 
This Court has recently said in the case of Gadd v. Olson, 
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984), that a motion for summary judgment (or 
for that matter any summary proceeding, a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action) can only be 
granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and even assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved 
against to be true, that the party could not prevail. This is a 
restatement of this Courtfs position in many cases concerning 
summary proceedings. See also Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 
(Utah 1983). 
Upon a summary motion being presented, the court can examine 
not only the pleadings themselves but other documents that were 
filed in this case which consisted of affidavits by both the 
president of the appellant company and the attorney for the 
appellant company. These affidavits, if true, support the 
appellant's theory that fraudulent acts by the respondent were 
committed. It is interesting to note that in all of the 
submissions in this case, the respondent never submitted an 
affidavit specifically denying the allegations contained in the 
two complaints that were filed or specifically denying that 
certain misrepresentations were not made. She consistently 
submitted affidavits only alleging that she considered the 
president of the appellant company to be a trespassor on the 
property. Therefore, at the motion hearings, the court had 
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nothing but the basic pleadings, the affidavits and, of course, 
the memorandums submitted by counsel which are part of the record 
in this Court. A reading of those affidavits alone establish 
that there are factual disputes that need to be resolved and 
establish a cause of action sounding in fraud. 
What is interesting is that in the lower court1s initial 
decision, with respect to the motion to summary judgment, the 
court denied the motion for summary judgment but specifically 
directed the appellant to amend it's complaint to allege fraud 
with particularity. The appellant did so. Then, respondent 
filed a motion to dismiss based upon no Cciuse of action conceding 
to some extent that the fraud had been pled with particularity 
but in effect saying that even if it is proven, it is of no 
consequence. The court took no testimony on this case nor 
considered any of the potential evidence other than that referred 
to in the memorandum of the parties. It would seem somewhat 
inconsistent for the lower court on the one hand to say that 
summary judgment would not granted as long as fraud was pled with 
particularity and then dismiss for failure to state a cause of 
action when, in fact, the fraud has now been pled with 
particularity and supported by affidavits. This proceeding 
deserves to have a full hearing on the merits and appellant 
believes that a thorough review of the record and the memorandum 
submitted by counsel as part of that record should convince this 




The trial court erred in granting respondent's motion to 
dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action in that a 
cause of action was stated, there were genuine issues of fact 
that required a full hearing and the proceeding should not have 
been disposed of in a summary fashion. This court is urged to 
reverse the lower court's decision and allow appellant it's day 
in court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this |H d^Y of March, 1985. 
JOm T. CAINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATRICIA M. BURKE, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
DEFENDANT f s COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. C84-3072 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 
56(b), defendant Patricia M. Burke moves the Court to dismiss 
plaintiff's Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted and for Summary Judgment 
in her favor upon defendant's Counterclaim because there are 
no material issues of fact; the grounds for this Motion are 
more fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief 
Can be Granted and Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaim of even date. 
DATED this day of August, 1984. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
larvhr A. (uajrsen 
Attorneys for P a t r i c i a M. Burke 
FILMED i 
MARK A. LARSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9 000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PATRICIA M. BURKE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C84-3072 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
On September 7, 1984, defendant's Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim came 
on for hearing before the above-captioned Court, the Honorable 
Judith M. Billings presiding. Plaintiff was represented by 
John T. Caine; defendant was represented by Mark A. Larsen. 
After considering the pleadings, motion, memorandum filed in 
support thereof, and the arguments of counsel, it is hereby 
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted is granted; plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice; 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaim is granted; 
3. Defendant Patricia M. Burke owns the real property 
described in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint and is entitled 
to quiet and peaceful possession thereof; 
4. Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment has no claim or 
interest whatsoever in or to the real property described in 
paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint; 
5. Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment, its employees, 
successors and assigns, are permanently enjoined from asserting 
any claim to the subject real property described in paragraph 2 
of the Amended Complaint adverse to defendant Patricia M. 
Burke's title; 
6. Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment is ordered to 
release the Lis Pendens which it filed in the above-captioned 
case within ten days from the date of this Order; 
7. Plaintiff Advance Business Equipment, its agents and 
employees, successors and assigns, including Richard C. Burke, 
are permanently enjoined from trespassing upon defendant Patricia 
M. Burke's real property described in paragraph 2 of the Amended 
Complaint; those agents and employees shall immediately remove 
all personal property from defendant's real property; 
8. Defendant's Motion for attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in the above-captioned matter is denied; 
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9. This Order is not intended to interfer with any 
action taken by the Court in the divorce action, Civil No. 
D-15225. 
DATED this <?L(c ~ day of September, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
7?i 
JVVpm M. BILLINGS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
. v 
3" ^ILUJC^^9^-^ 
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